LOCAL CORPUS TERMINAL
STATUS: ONLINE
MODE: READ-ONLY
UPDATED:
Topic hub
Cyber, critical infrastructure, telecommunications, counterspace, space, and resilience records.
Space is now a strategic dependency layer for the United States, its allies, commercial society, and adversary military systems. Public U.S. intelligence reporting describes space as increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities and a wider range of state and nonstate actors able t…
Cyber and critical infrastructure risk is now a global strategic defense issue, not a narrow technical security file. Public U.S. intelligence reporting identifies China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, ransomware groups, cybercriminals, and hacktivists as continuing threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. Th…
the corpus should treat defensive cyber as a standing source lane rather than a one-off topic. The highest-value structure is a recurring watch that links official advisories, vulnerability metadata, vendor mitigations, sector context, and caveats into a searchable corpus.
The Russia state-cyber lane is now packetized. The current official-source record supports four safe extraction lanes:
The Russia cyber lane should not be treated as one undifferentiated APT list. Public records mix GRU military-intelligence cases, FSB-linked political interference and espionage warnings, possible SVR lanes that require separate source capture, Ukraine-war disruptive activity, legal actions, sanctions, reward notices,…
PRC space and counterspace should now be treated as a dedicated China/PLA source lane rather than a residual space-baseline topic. DoD 2025 and ODNI 2026 provide the public U.S. assessment frame: China is expanding military space capabilities, improving space-enabled command, control, communications, computers, intell…
Salt Typhoon now has a dedicated telecommunications defensive source lane in the corpus. The accessible official record in this pass supports three safe conclusions:
PRC cyber is now a dedicated defensive source lane rather than a broad "future cyber packet" queue item. ODNI 2026 provides the current public IC strategic frame: China is described as the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. government, private-sector, and critical-infrastructure networks, while multiple s…
the corpus documentation product.
the corpus already has a strong PRC cyber and critical-infrastructure lane, including a Salt Typhoon telecommunications note and a PRC APT/Typhoon label crosswalk. The Russia lane now has its first dedicated state-cyber source packet, which separates GRU, FSB, queued SVR, Ukraine-war, legal-action, sanctions/reward, a…
When a row feeds another product, carry forward the source class, caveat tag, and freshness status. Do not carry over technical details that would reproduce exploitation or offensive procedure.
Foreign terrorist organizations and major nonstate armed networks are best classified in the corpus as distributed coercive violence ecosystems. They are not a single actor class with one ideology, sponsor, method, or geography. They include jihadist networks, Iran-aligned armed groups, nationalist and separatist orga…
See [Source Registers hub](README.md) and [Documentation Index](../index.md).