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Coverage Map

source packets, explainers, trackers, timelines, actor profiles, maps, and standards as of the information cutoff.

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UNCLASSIFIED//OPEN SOURCE

Product ID: WI-COVERAGE-MAP-2026-0001

Prepared UTC: 2026-06-18T11:54:34Z

Information cutoff UTC: 2026-06-18T11:54:34Z

Source base: Existing WARLOCK-INDEX assessments, source registers, source packets, explainers, trackers, timelines, actor profiles, maps, and standards as of the information cutoff.

Analytic confidence: High for repository coverage state and planned corpus organization. Moderate for prioritization because future source availability and public-event cadence can change build order.

This map defines the initial archive architecture for WARLOCK-INDEX. It is not a list of recommendations. It is a research coverage model for organizing future open-source defense assessments.

Theater Lanes

  • Global strategic environment.
  • Homeland and Western Hemisphere.
  • Indo-Pacific.
  • Europe and Russia.
  • Middle East.
  • Arctic and High North.
  • Africa security environment.
  • Space and orbital competition.
  • Cyber and critical infrastructure.

Actor Lanes

  • People's Republic of China.
  • Russian Federation.
  • Islamic Republic of Iran.
  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
  • Transnational criminal organizations.
  • Foreign terrorist organizations and major nonstate armed networks.
  • NATO and major U.S. allies.
  • U.S. defense industrial base.

Domain Lanes

  • Nuclear and strategic deterrence.
  • Conventional force modernization.
  • Maritime power and sea control.
  • Maritime chokepoints, canal exposure, freight, insurance, and allied maritime response.
  • Air and missile defense.
  • Uncrewed systems and counter-UAS.
  • Cyber operations and infrastructure risk.
  • Space and counterspace.
  • Information operations and political warfare.
  • Defense industry, munitions, shipbuilding, and logistics.
  • Energy, critical minerals, and supply chains.
  • AI, quantum, semiconductors, and emerging technology.
  • WMD, biodefense, and nonproliferation.
  • Strategy, stratagems, deterrence, coercion, military innovation, and warfare research.

Product Types

  • Strategic baseline.
  • Global operating picture.
  • Actor profile.
  • Explainer.
  • Theater profile.
  • Event timeline.
  • Capability profile.
  • Source packet.
  • Tracker.
  • Indicator watchlist.
  • Actor-domain assimilation matrix.
  • Chokepoint assimilation matrix.
  • Assumption check.
  • Prior assessment update.

Documentation Depth Model

  • Explainers: Reader-facing topic explanations. They teach what a topic means, why it matters, how the system works, what evidence can and cannot show, common misreadings, and what public indicators should be watched.
  • Source packets: Evidence maps. They identify source families, extraction fields, caveats, and cross references.
  • Trackers: Collection queues. They show what has been captured, what is pending, and what should be refreshed.
  • Assessments: Dated analytical judgments with source bases, confidence language, and boundaries.
  • Matrices: Cross-corpus synthesis products that connect actors, theaters, domains, and source lanes.

Priority Source Families

  • U.S. statutory and strategy documents.
  • U.S. intelligence, homeland security, law-enforcement, sanctions, border, maritime, cyber, and geospatial public source families, including the U.S. law-enforcement threat source capture packet for FBI, DHS, DOJ, DEA, ATF, CBP, Coast Guard, Treasury, State, and IC3 routing, plus the U.S. law enforcement threat source assessment for separating mission pages, complaint data, legal records, sanctions/designations, statistics, and annual assessments.
  • Public map source families, including NGA maps, USGS topographic sources, NOAA nautical-chart sources, BGN geographic-name sources, combatant-command AOR pages, NATO public maps, Library of Congress maps, foreign national mapping agencies, and the WARLOCK-INDEX Maps directory.
  • U.S. Combatant Command public testimony and posture statements.
  • DoD annual military power reports.
  • ODNI and IC public threat assessments.
  • China/PLA official and issuer-perspective source stacks, including DoD PRC military power reporting, ODNI China threat framing, DIA historical baselines, PRC State Council/MND/PLA official-media source families, PRC MND and PLA official-media dated capture, DoD-to-PRC issuer-language crosswalks, PLA services and arms source-family separation, Taiwan MND source-family routing, Taiwan pressure and cross-Strait coercion source treatment, allied/regional defense white papers, cyber advisories, South China Sea legal sources, South China Sea coercion/legal-source treatment, PRC cyber and critical-infrastructure defensive source treatment, Salt Typhoon telecommunications defensive source treatment, PRC APT/Typhoon label crosswalk and advisory-refresh source treatment, PRC space/counterspace and information-support source treatment, and China-specific tracker/matrix products.
  • Cyber nation-state actor and APT source families, including PRC, Russian, Iranian, DPRK, and state-crime overlap lanes; FBI cyber and country-overview source routing; CISA/NSA/FBI defensive advisories; IC3 complaint-source context; DOJ legal actions; Treasury/OFAC cyber sanctions; State Rewards for Justice cyber routes; allied cyber-center cross-checks; PRC APT/Typhoon label control; the Russia state cyber source packets; the weekly current source sweep tracker; and source-classed APT label treatment, handled without exploit steps, IOCs, malware procedures, provider vulnerability mapping, sanctions-evasion guidance, or operational cyber guidance.
  • ODNI declassified WMD, biosecurity, foreign-laboratory, and threat-reduction disclosures where handled as issuer-perspective source events with explicit no-methods and no-facility-detail boundaries.
  • WMD/biosecurity public source families, including biodefense strategy, DTRA/threat-reduction, FBI WMD, select-agent oversight, BWC treaty routing, emerging biotechnology security, Ukraine biolab claim reconciliation, and other claim-reconciliation lanes.
  • NATO and allied government strategy documents, including national security strategies, defense reviews, cyber/space strategies, resilience frameworks, industrial strategies, budgets, and audit sources.
  • U.S.-NATO Europe force posture review sources, including Department of War speech/transcript routes, direct official social-media URLs, durable archive routes, NATO meeting records, congressional oversight, allied national responses, and current reporting used only as a caveated source-treatment lane until official review terms or implementation documents are captured.
  • AUKUS industrial implementation source families, including Australian Submarine Agency program, industry, build, sustainment, workforce, security, Henderson, Osborne, SRF-West, and SRF-West infrastructure pages; U.S. official AUKUS and CRS submarine-industrial-base sources; and UK nuclear-enterprise and SSN-AUKUS contract sources.
  • Defense industrial base, munitions, and shipbuilding source families, including DoD Industrial Base Policy, National Defense Industrial Strategy, 2026 National Defense Strategy, Navy shipbuilding budget and planning source families, NAVSEA and public shipyard routing, the dedicated Navy shipbuilding and repair industrial capacity packet, GAO weapon-system and shipbuilding oversight, CRS defense industrial base and Navy source families, AUKUS submarine industrial-base implementation, ICE Pact icebreaker and Arctic warning implementation, EU Readiness 2030 defense-industrial implementation, the allied DIB country crosswalk, UK defense investment/readiness implementation, Japan defense buildup implementation, NATO and allied industrial-capacity lanes, and the DIB capacity tracker and assimilation matrix.
  • Explanatory documentation lanes, including the defense industrial base, air and missile defense, drone/counter-UAS, shipbuilding and repair, allied DIB, China/PLA modernization, Iran/Middle East pressure, and Ukraine external support explainers. These are used to make source-heavy documentation readable without weakening source discipline.
  • Strategy and warfare academic research source families, including Army War College Parameters and SSI, NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly, Modern War Institute, Texas National Security Review, RAND, CSIS, CSBA, Naval War College Review, and other public war-studies routes. These are used for concept mapping around stratagems, deterrence, coercion, deception and surprise, gray-zone competition, military innovation, mobilization, defense economics, and civil-military relations, handled without target selection, operational planning, tactical procedures, weapons employment, deception plans, cyber methods, evasion techniques, procurement advice, or vulnerability analysis.
  • Munitions and energetics source families, including DoD and service budget source lanes, Congress.gov authorization and appropriation routes, CRS and GAO oversight, CBO cost-analysis routing, NATO/EU/allied replenishment lanes, Ukraine-support demand signals, artillery and conventional ammunition, missiles and interceptors, air-defense reloads, rocket motors, propellants, explosives, fuzes, warheads, guided munitions, and drone or counter-UAS effector source queues.
  • Air and missile defense industrial capacity source families, including DoD, service, MDA, Congress.gov, CRS, GAO, CBO, allied air-defense source lanes, Ukraine, Middle East, Red Sea, Indo-Pacific, homeland, and strategic-weapons cross-links, handled without weapons employment, sensor-coverage, defended asset, inventory, reload-timeline, targeting, or allocation guidance.
  • Drone and counter-UAS industrial capacity source families, including DoD, service, Joint C-sUAS public source families, Ukraine lessons, allied source lanes, critical materials, batteries, microelectronics, software, munitions, sensors, and air-defense cross-links, handled without tactical employment, jamming, evasion, protected-site vulnerability, targeting, deployment guidance, or technical build instructions.
  • Critical materials and defense supply-chain source families, including USGS critical minerals and commodity summaries, DOE critical materials, DLA Strategic Materials and National Defense Stockpile routing, DoD industrial-base supply-chain sources, Commerce CHIPS, Commerce/BIS export controls, Federal Register legal notices, Congress.gov, CRS, GAO, CBO, EU critical raw materials, NATO/allied resilience, AUKUS supply-chain dependencies, China/PLA semiconductor and material dependency cross-checks, and Ukraine support demand signals, handled without supplier targeting, stockpile exploitation, export-control evasion, or controlled technical-data workarounds.
  • NORAD modernization implementation source families, including Canada project-timeline and funding fact sheets, Our North Strong and Free Annex C, DND departmental planning, Canada budget chapters, Canada-U.S. joint statements, NORAD mission/agreement pages, NORAD/USNORTHCOM strategy, and DoD Arctic Strategy sources, handled without sensor-performance, command-procedure, facility-vulnerability, route-guidance, or readiness inference.
  • ICE Pact and Arctic warning implementation source families, including Canada-U.S.-Finland icebreaker cooperation, Canadian polar icebreaker contracts, U.S. and Finnish official follow-on capture, Coast Guard and shipbuilding lanes, northern support hubs, airborne early warning, maritime sensors, Arctic satellite ground-station routing, and NORAD modernization cross-links, handled without route guidance, sensor-performance inference, facility-vulnerability analysis, procurement advice, or operational planning.
  • Nordic and High North allied national source stacks, including Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland as dedicated Nordic/North Atlantic baselines, Denmark Arctic/North Atlantic implementation source treatment, and EU security-defense sources providing the adjacent multilateral layer.
  • EU Readiness 2030 implementation source families, including SAFE, EDIP, EDIS, EDA, Council, Parliament, Official Journal, EU budget, military mobility, Ukraine-support, cyber/resilience, and member-state uptake lanes, handled without readiness scoring, procurement advice, route guidance, or operational planning.
  • India/Quad strategic-partner source stacks, including Quad ministerial and leader statements, India MEA source-family routing, U.S.-India iCET and INDUS-X sources, Indian PIB science/technology releases, and follow-on Indian MOD, parliamentary, budget, audit, DRDO, maritime, critical-minerals, and energy-security source refreshes.
  • Philippines official defense and maritime source stacks, including NSC, DND, DFA, PCG, BFAR, NAMRIA, Official Gazette legal routes, EDCA, maritime zones, archipelagic sea lanes, West Philippine Sea issuer-language source routing, U.S. State/DoD/USINDOPACOM cross-checks, and PCA/State legal-source companions, handled without basing inference, patrol planning, live tracking, route guidance, legal advice, sensor-coverage extraction, or operational guidance.
  • ASEAN and claimant/coastal-state South China Sea source stacks, including ASEAN DOC/COC routes, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, UN/UNCLOS, PCA, State Limits in the Seas, and existing Philippines/PRC companion packets, handled as source-provenance and cross-check lanes without legal advice, route guidance, live tracking, sensor-coverage extraction, or operational guidance.
  • Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability Office reports.
  • Reputable research institutions with transparent methods.
  • Professional media reporting used for current-event context.
  • Post-New START arms-control status sources, including treaty archives, research synthesis, reported informal-observance lanes, public restraint statements, transparency substitutes, and successor-framework source families.

Quality Gate For New Products

Before a new assessment is considered part of the finished corpus, the core metadata set includes:

  • A clear product ID.
  • A UTC preparation time.
  • A UTC information cutoff.
  • Source class notes.
  • Confidence language.
  • At least one official or otherwise high-reliability source for major judgments.
  • A no-recommendations and no-operational-guidance boundary.
  • A source list that a later researcher can follow.

Documentation Cross References